The Quebec Agreement

The James Bay and Northern Quebec Accord (JBNQA) is a legally valid agreement signed on November 11, 1975 by the Government of Quebec, the Government of Canada, Hydro-Québec and two of its subsidiaries, the Grand Conseil des Crees du Québec and the Inuit Association of Northern Quebec. The JBNQA redefined and reformulated land management and the relationship between the State of Quebec and the Indigenous peoples of James Bay and the Northern Quebec region (see James Bay Project, Contracts with Indigenous Peoples in Canada). I hope that by referring to this telegram, the Prime Minister is not trying to use the propaganda material used in at least two conservative newspapers. He will have had the opportunity to do some research, as I thought. May I therefore ask whether he does not know, as the Office confirms to me, that the war cabinet was not informed of the 1943 agreement? In all circumstances, wouldn`t it be good for him to admit it and, if there is a case on which we can argue, to have him argued on another occasion? I am sure he knows from the cabinet files that the war cabinet was not informed, as I confirmed by the Cabinet Office? However, more than thirty amendment agreements, ancillary agreements and relevant laws illustrate the complexity and dynamics of the agreement. In 1984, the Canadian Parliament kept its promise of Aboriginal autonomy and passed the Cree-Naskapi (Quebec) Act, the first of its kind at the national level (see Aboriginal Autonomy in Canada). The Naskapi joined the JBNQA in 1978 by signing the Northeastern Québec subsidiary agreement. The current agreements between the United States and the United Kingdom on the civil use 964 of nuclear energy include an exchange of information on a limited area. There is no agreement on the exchange of information on the development or manufacture of nuclear weapons.

We are developing our nuclear programme, both civilian and military, as we see fit and as required by the national interest. Of Roosevelt`s advisers, only Hopkins and Admiral William D. Leahy were aware of this secret war agreement, and Leahy, perhaps because he never believed the nuclear bomb would work, and therefore perhaps did not pay attention, just had a confused memory of what had been said. [119] [120] When Wilson presented Hyde Park Aide-Mémoire at a meeting of the Combined Policy Committee in June 1945, the American copy could not be found. [121] The British sent a photocopy to Stimson on July 18. [122] Already at that time, Groves questioned the authenticity of the document until the American copy was found many years later in the papers of Vice Admiral Wilson Brown, Jr., Roosevelt`s naval adviser, apparently misplaced in the Roosevelt Hyde Park papers by someone who did not know what Tube Alloys was and who thought it had something to do with Navy guns or boiler towels. [121] [123] [124] The British government was the first to recognize the need for such an agreement. They themselves had questioned the fact that with their knowledge of atomic energy science, a nuclear weapon is both feasible and feasible. But at the end of 1941, they realized that, within the time frame and scale of the current war, the development of a useful nuclear weapon totally exceeded the strength of the person and the material capabilities of their country and empire. Only the United States had a vast technological base in science and technology, enormous resources in skilled and skilled labor; and an industrial infrastructure that could bear the brunt of the development and production of nuclear weapons, while meeting the daily production requirements of war. This is the reason why Winston Churchill`s scientific and war mobilization advisers had advised him to seek the conditions for the establishment of an Anglo-American nuclear bomb project. .

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